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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
By this appeal, the Schoorls seek a determination that Idaho' s adverse possession and 
ejectment statutes, including the limitations periods contained therein, are matters of substantive 
law that may not be retroactively applied. From there, the Schoorls seek a further determination 
that the limitations period contained within Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes 
commences to run at the time a party begins to adversely possess property and that the statutory 
limitations period in effect as of that date governs the parties' respective rights, duties, and 
obligations. 
B. Concise Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings Below 
Plaintiffs Donald Edward Schoorl and Sonia Linn Schoorl, as Trustees of the Donald and 
Sonia Schoorl Trust ult/a/ March 2, 2015, brought an action to quiet title to a strip of property 
purchased on or about November 11, 2001, by their predecessor in interest, Gerret and Sharon 
Schoorl.1 R. Vol. I, p. 8. After purchasing the property, the Schoorls enclosed the parcel with a 
fence and began pasturing animals on it. R. Vol. I, p. 8.2 The Schoorls have continued to use the 
property in that manner and without interruption from November of 2001 until the present date. 
R. Vol. I, p. 8. 
After being served with process, Guild Mortgage Company3 moved to dismiss based on 
the defense that the twenty (20) year limitations period established by the July 1, 2006, 
amendments to the adverse possession and ejectment statutes applied to the Schoorls' claims. R. 
1 Though the property is now titled in the name of the Trust, the trustees of the trust are Garret Schoorl ' s son and 
daughter-in-law. Garret and Sharon Schoorl still reside on the premises. Because of this familial relationship and 
the continuity of possession, for ease of reference this brief will use the surname Schoorl to reference both the Trust 
and the predecessor in interest to the property, Gerret and Sharon Schoorl. 
2 Pursuant to 1.A.R. 35, the subject property is depicted in Exhibit A attached hereto. 
3 The remaining defendants joined in Guild Mortgage Company's motion to dismiss and asserted identical 
arguments. For ease of reference, this brief will refer to only Guild Mortgage Company. 
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Vol. I, p. 19. Based thereon, Guild Mortgage Company argued that the Schoorls had not 
possessed the land long enough to acquire the rights established by Idaho's adverse possession 
statutes. R. Vol. I, pp. 21-28. 
The Schoorls disagreed, arguing that the five (5) year limitations period contained within 
the 2001 adverse possession and ejectment statutes-the year when the Schoorls purchased, 
enclosed, and began occupying the subject property-applied to their claim to quiet title by 
adverse possession. R. Vol. I, pp. 60-63. 
The District Court agreed with Guild Mortgage Company' s position and held that the 
limitations period contained in the 2006 amendments, rather than the law that was in place when 
the adverse possession period began, applied to the Schoorls' claims. R. Vol. I, pp. 79-82. 
Because it is undisputed that the Schoorls purchased and have been in possession of the property 
since 2001 , the District Court found that they had not possessed the strip for the twenty (20) year 
limitations period required by the 2006 statutory amendments and granted defendants' motion to 
dismiss. R. Vol. I, pp. 82. 
Because the District Court erred in applying the incorrect limitations period, the Schoorls 
timely brought this appeal. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the statutory authority providing for rights of adverse possession and 
ejectment, including the limitations periods contained therein, are substantive laws that may not 
be applied retroactively. 
2. Whether the limitations period for rights and obligations arising under Idaho's 
adverse possession and ejectment statutes commences to run as of the date a party begins 
adversely possessing the property. 
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ID. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Schoorls are not seeking attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court freely reviews questions of law. Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-
Bilt Generator, Inc. , 14 7 Idaho 56, 58, 205 P .3d 1192, 1194 (2009). When reviewing an order 
dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) the same standard of review is applied as to a 
motion for summary judgment. Coalition/or Agric. 's Future v. Canyon County, No. 42756, 2016 
WL 1133369, at *3 (Idaho Mar. 23, 2016). An appeal from an order of summary judgment is 
reviewed de novo and the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion for 
summary judgment is used. Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, No. 41990, 2016 WL 
937694, at *2 (Idaho Mar. 9, 2016), reh'g denied (Mar. 10, 2016). There is no dispute regarding 
any issue of fact relevant to this appeal. Rather, the sole dispute is which statute of limitations 
applies: a pure question of law. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. Because Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes, including the limitations 
period contained therein, are matters of substantive law, amendments thereto may 
not be retroactively applied. 
This Court should overturn the decision of the District Court because Idaho' s adverse 
possession and ejectment statutes, including the limitations period contained therein, are 
substantive and cannot, therefore, be retroactively applied. It is well settled under Idaho law that 
"no statute is retroactive 'unless expressly so declared."' Lincoln County v. Fidelity and Deposit 
Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 491, 632 P.2d 678, 681 (1981) (quoting IDAHO CODE § 73-
101 ). Statutes that impact substantive rights, rather than strictly procedural or remedial rights, 
cannot be applied retroactively. Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228,235, 775 P.2d 120, 127 (1989). 
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Because adverse possession and ejectment statutes are substantive, amendments thereto cannot 
be retroactively applied. 
1. Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes are matters of substantive 
law. 
Idaho's statutory authority regarding the rights and obligations of parties related to 
actions for ejectment and acquiring title by adverse possession are matters of substantive law. 
Statutes are said to impact substantive rights when they "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy 
contractual or vested rights." Myers v. Vermass, 114 Idaho 85, 87, 753 P.2d 296, 298 (Ct. App. 
1988) (holding that the amendment of a statute to mandate an award of attorney's fees "enlarged 
the scope of entitlement to mandatory attorney fee awards" and, as such, was properly 
characterized as substantive) cf Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585 P.2d 1276 (1978) (holding 
that amendment to statute allowing for discretionary award of attorney's fees was remedial). 
Adverse possession statutes create vested property rights; their corollaries, ejectrnent statutes, 
destroy those same vested property rights. 
In supporting its decision to retroactively apply the 2006 amendment to the limitations 
period contained within Idaho's adverse possession and ejectrnent statutes, the District Court 
erroneously concluded that, because the rights were not fully vested (i.e., because the limitations 
periods had not fully run), the adverse possession and ejectrnent statutes were not substantive. 
This was an incorrect analysis of the substantive vs. procedural/remedial distinction. 
In its decision, the District Court incorrectly characterized the Schoorls as arguing that: 
"Application of the amended version . . . would be impermissibly retroactive because it would 
'create, enlarge, diminish or destroy' their 'vested' right to claim ownership of the subject 
property by adverse possession." R. Vol. I, p. 79. By its selective use of quoted words from the 
relevant phraseology, the District Court applied the law so as to deem any rights that were not 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 4 
fully vested, any transaction that was not final and complete, at the time of a statutory 
amendment could be impacted by said statutory amendment. That is not, however, the argument 
made by the Schoorls nor is it the state ofldaho law. 
The case of Myers v. Vermaas makes it clear that where a party undertakes certain legal 
actions with known attendant consequences-in that case, the filing of a lawsuit- that any law 
that would thereafter change or alter those known attendant consequences constitutes a 
substantive law that cannot be retroactively applied. 114 Idaho 85, 753 P .2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988). 
In Vermaas, the Court of Appeals held that a legislative amendment to a mandatory attorney' s 
fees statute was substantive and therefore, could not apply to a lawsuit that had already been 
filed and was pending at the time of the amendment. Id. at 87. The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that the statute "affects decisions to litigate commercial disputes" and that retroactive application 
of the legislation would "distort [the] decision making process" by "profoundly alter[ing]- after 
the fact-the costs and benefits of submitting a meritorious ( albeit disputed) claim to the courts 
for resolution." Id; see also Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 235, 775 P.2d 120, 127 (1989) 
(affirming the reasoning of the Court of Appeals). 
It cannot be gainsaid that the commencement of a lawsuit, in and of itself, constitutes a 
''vested right" or a "completed transaction" in the sense that the District Court relied on those 
terms when it denied the Schoorls' claims. Rather, the commencement of a lawsuit is a 
triggering event that leads to the creation (or destruction) of vested rights.4 Accordingly, that 
4 The case of Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, Inc. , lends further support to the Schoorls' position that whether the 
retroactive application of a statute impacts substantive rights is a function of the date of the "triggering event" that 
would be impacted by applying the statute. 131 Idaho 105,108,952 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1998). In Tuttle, a lawsuit 
had been filed and was pending when an amendment governing allocation of damages between joint tortfeasors 
came into effect. Id. After the statute was passed, the litigants entered into a settlement agreement to which the 
amended statute applied. Id. The Court reasoned that as of the date the amendment was passed, the settlement 
agreement that would be impacted by the statute was not yet in place. Id Because the creation of the contractual 
settlement agreement, rather than the initiation of the lawsuit, served as the triggering event, the Court concluded that applying the amendment did not constitute a retroactive application of the statute. Id. 
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triggering event locks into place the substantive rights of the parties that will govern the legal 
relationship between them moving forward in that legal context-even though their respective 
rights relating to the lawsuit will not be "vested" or "matured" until the lawsuit is ultimately 
resolved. 
Just as a mandatory attorney fee award constitutes a substantive law that necessarily 
impacts a party' s decision making process when deciding to file a lawsuit, the mandatory 
requirements of adverse possession and ejectment statutes are substantive laws that will 
necessarily impact the decision making process of a party engaging in actions necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of the adverse possession statute. Accordingly, just as retroactive 
application of the mandatory attorney fee award will "profoundly alter-after the fact-the costs 
and benefits" of filing a lawsuit, so too would the retroactive application of any change to the 
requirements of an adverse possession or ejectment statute. 
Adverse possession statutes set forth specific requirements that a party must follow in 
order to create vested property rights. Ejectment statutes set forth specific requirements that a 
party must follow or their vested property rights will be destroyed in favor of the adverse 
possessor. These laws are substantive laws that create and destroy vested rights. Because they 
are substantive, any amendments thereto may not be retroactively applied. 
2. The limitations period contained within Idaho's adverse possession and 
ejectment statutes are substantive. 
In this matter, the particular statutory requirement that was amended in the adverse 
possession and ejectment statutes was the amount of time within which a party is required to 
bring an action for ejectment in order to prevent that party from losing its property rights to the 
adverse possessor. Stated simply, the limitations period changed. Given that adverse possession 
and ejectment statutes are substantive, the limitations periods contained within such statutes 
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constitute an integral part of the statutory rights thereby created or destroyed. Accordingly, the 
District Court erred by retroactively applying the amended limitations period from the adverse 
possession and ejectment statutes as a bar to the Schoorls' claim. 
Statutes of limitation may be characterized as substantive, remedial, or procedural: 
"Statute of limitations are neither substantive nor procedural per se but have 'mixed substantive 
and procedural aspects."' Lujan v. Regents of U of Cal. 69 FJd 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 2129 (1988) (Brennan, J., 
concurring)). "Depending on the context, courts have reached different conclusions about 
whether a statute of limitations is substantive or procedural." Id. ( cataloguing numerous cases). 
Whether limitations periods are substantive, procedural, or remedial is not simply a 
matter of judicial whim or case-by-case convenience. It is well settled that limitations periods 
contained within a statutory act that gives rise to a particular right are properly characterized as 
substantive. "[W]here a statute of limitations does not merely bar the remedy for the violation of 
a right but limits or conditions the right itself, courts have treated the statute as substantive." Id. 
at 1517. "A statute of limitations that restricts a right created by statute rather than a right at 
common law generally is deemed to be a substantive limit on the right as opposed to a mere 
procedural limit on the remedy." Sarfati v. Wood Holly Associates, 874 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th 
Cir. 1989). 
Adverse possession is a statutorily created right that did not exist at common law. "The 
common law did not recognize a transference of title through adverse possession. Such law 
seemed to be oppugnant to one of the most fundamental axioms of the law." J & M Land Co. v. 
First Union Nat. Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 500-01 (2001)5 (citations omitted). Because adverse 
5 For a detailed, historical discussion of the statutory development of adverse possession as a means of acquiring title to property, see J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat. Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 501-02 (2001). 
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possession is a statutorily created right, the limitations periods contained in adverse possession 
statutes are properly characterized as substantive. 
Addressing a situation directly analogous to the case at hand, Sarfati v. Wood Holly 
Associates determined that the action should be governed by the limitations period in effect when 
the cause of action to enforce a statutorily created right accrued-not the longer limitations 
period set forth by amendment. 874 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1989). In Sarfati, after a statutorily 
created right accrued, but before it had expired, legislative amendment extended the statutory 
limitations period. The 11th Circuit was asked to decide whether to apply the two year 
limitations period that existed at the time the cause of action accrued or the three year limitations 
period contained in the amended statute. Id. at 1524-25. 
After undertaking a detailed study, the Sarfati Court noted that where the limitations 
provision is an integral part of the right created, it is deemed to be substantive and not 
procedural. Id. at 1525. The Court went on to note that "an amendment to a limitations period 
that is an integral part of the right will not be retroactively applied to cover causes of action 
already in existence, unless the legislature manifests such an intent." Id. at 1526 (multiple 
citations omitted). 
The Sarfati Court further explained that in order for a limitations period to be considered 
an integral part of the statute giving rise to the right, the limitations period must be contained in 
the act creating the right itself, not a different act or a borrowed or general limitations provision. 
Id ; accord J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat. Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 517 (2001) ("A substantive 
statute of limitations is found in legislation creating a cause of action that did not exist at 
common law."). Finding that the limitations period was an integral part of the right itself, the 
Sarfati Court held that the limitations period was substantive and not procedural and, based 
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thereon, applied the limitations period that was in place at the time the cause of action accrued, 
not the extended limitations period provided by subsequent legislative amendment. 6 Id. at 1527-
28. This result is consistent with cases dealing with amendments to limitations periods in 
adverse possession and ejectment statutes. See Petropoulos v. City of West Allis, 148 Wis.2d 
762, 768, 436 N.W.2d 880, 882 (1989) (applying 40-year limitations period that existed when 
adverse possession commenced rather than the 20-year limitations period established by 
amendment) and Lyles v. Roach, 30 S.C. 291, 9 S.E. 334 (1889) (applying 20-year limitations 
period that existed when adverse possession commenced rather than the 10-year limitations 
period established by amendment). 
Adverse possession statutes create vested property rights; ejectment statutes destroy 
vested property rights. Consistent with Idaho law, because these statutes create and/or destroy 
vested property rights, they are substantive and cannot be applied retroactively. Moreover, the 
limitations periods contained within adverse possession and ejectment statutes are integral to the 
rights created and destroyed by such statutory enactments. Because these limitations periods are 
integral to substantive law they are properly characterized as substantive limitations periods and 
amendments thereto cannot be retroactively applied. 
B. The District Court erred by refusing to apply the 2001 limitations period that was in 
place at the time the Schoorls purchased the property and commenced their adverse 
possession. 
Once it is settled that the limitations periods of the adverse possession and ejectment 
statutes may not be retroactively applied, it becomes necessary to determine the triggering event 
for deciding which limitations period applies. In its decision, the District Court correctly 
6 The Sarfati Court also appropriately analyzed whether the legislature expressly stated that the act should be applied 
retroactively, as that is the second scenario in which amendments affecting substantive rights may be retroactively 
applied. Id. at 1525, 1527-28. There is no indication that the legislature intended that the 2006 amendments to 
Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes be retroactively applied. 
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observed that IDAHO CODE § 5-203 "sets forth a limitations period after which original owners 
may no longer seek to eject adverse possessors." R. Vol. I, p. 80. The Court also correctly noted 
that a claim to title by adverse possession "matures" only after the full statutory period has run. 
R. Vol. I, p. 80. The Court erred, however, in concluding that the maturity date of an adverse 
possession claim-rather than the commencement date of the actions constituting adverse 
possession-was the triggering event that determined the applicable limitations period. 
It is well settled and, indeed, the District Court acknowledged, that a cause of action for a 
right of re-entry accrues the moment adverse possession begins. R. Vol. I, p. 80 ( citing 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 460 cmt. a (1944) (explaining "ejectment 'statutes 
prescribe a fixed period of time after which no entry may be made nor action brought to recover 
the possession of land'"); id. § 465 cmt. a (explaining "a cause of action arises against" the 
adverse possessor "at the moment the use is made"). Indeed, this authority is consistent with the 
results reached by cases addressing the applicable limitations period for actions for ejectment or 
adverse possession, which universally hold that it is the moment that the owner becomes made 
aware of acts constituting adverse possession that the limitations period begins to run. Smith v. 
Long, 76 Idaho 265,276, 281 P.2d 483,491 (1955) ("Section 5-205 LC., requires action to be 
commenced within five years of the accrual of a right of entry."); Petropoulos v. City of West 
Allis, 148 Wis.2d 762,768,436 N.W.2d 880,882 (1989) (holding that the key date was the date 
the owners had notice that the adverse possessor was attempting to reclaim the disputed 
property); Lyles v. Roach, 30 S.C. 291, 9 S.E. 334, 335 (1889) ("The currency of the statute 
commences when the cause of action accrues ... 'Whenever there is a plaintiff who can sue and a 
defendant who can be sued the statute begins to run. A right of action has accrued,' and the 
limitation in force at the accrual of the right is the limitation which must govern."). 
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Despite correctly noting that a cause of action for ejectment accrues the moment adverse 
possession begins, the District Court failed to follow Idaho law that makes it clear the applicable 
limitations period is the period in place at the time a cause of action accrues. Stoner v. Carr, 97 
Idaho 641,643,550 P.2d 259,261 (1976) (holding that the triggering event was the discovery of 
the foreign object in the patient and that the limitations period at the time that event occurred was 
the controlling statute). 
In order to support its decision, the District Court treated adverse possession and 
ejectment statutory limitations periods as remedial rather than substantive. R. Vol. I, p. 81 
(relying on IDAHO CODE § 73-107) and R. Vol. I, p. 82 (relying on State v. 0 'Neill, 118 Idaho 
244, 248, 796 P.2d 121, 125 (1990) (discussing limitations periods applicable to criminal 
actions).7 However, because adverse possession and ejectment limitations periods are 
substantive the authority upon which the District Court relied to support its decision is inapposite 
and its conclusion is error. 
This Court should reverse the District Court's decision dismissing the Schoorls' claim to 
quiet title through adverse possession because such decision was based on the erroneous 
retroactive application of the 2006 amendments to the adverse possession and ejectment statutes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, the Schoorls respectfully request that this Court hold that the 
limitations period contained within Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes are matters 
7 Notably, the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that immunity from suit is not a vested property right. Hecla 
Min. Co. v. Idaho State Tax. Comm'n, 108 Idaho 147, 150,697 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1985). Accordingly, cases dealing 
with the expiration of a limitations period, particularly when said limitations period does not impact a substantive 
right, are not controlling in this matter. "Where a lapse of time has not invested a party with title to real or personal 
property, a state legislature may extend a lapsed statute of limitations without violating the fourteenth amendment, 
regardless of whether the effect is seen as creating or reviving a barred claim." Id. While this appeal deals with an 
amended limitations period that had not fully run, this case is instructive in demonstrating that limitations periods 
addressing substantive rights (i.e., real property rights) are materially different than limitations periods involving a 
criminal's right to repose from suit. 
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of substantive law that cannot be retroactively applied. The Schoorls further request that this 
Court hold that the event that triggers the running of the limitations periods contained in adverse 
possession and ejectment statutes is the date the actions commencing adverse possession begin. 
From there, the Schoorls request that this Court remand the matter for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Dated this 3rd day of May, 2016. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
By ;-Zf .f{;~ 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
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